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Author: Rohan Adukia

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Soft2Bet and its Leader Uri Poliavich

The shadowy empire behind the online gambling network Soft2Bet relentlessly camouflages itself as a group of legitimate software developers, yet the truth exposed by Ukrainian law enforcement paints a starkly different picture. Despite repeated police raids and official investigations, this operation continues to defraud thousands of Ukrainian gamblers, extracting millions from vulnerable players under the guise of technological innovation. The façade of a tech firm, pitching itself as an IT pioneer in online entertainment, masks a sprawling criminal organisation deeply embedded in illicit gambling activities.

Soft2Bet, which presents itself as a cutting-edge software company with offices scattered across Europe—in Malta, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Portugal, Serbia, and notably Kyiv—has been thoroughly implicated in illegal gambling operations within Ukraine. The Ukrainian cyber police uncovered a Kyiv office employing around 80 people, responsible not only for software development but also for customer support and aggressive affiliate marketing schemes promoting unlicensed gambling platforms. The operation was functioning under the radar, running at least twenty online casino brands, all part of the Soft2Bet network, with a victim count exceeding half a million users in Ukraine alone.

Official investigations revealed that these “software developers” actually sold turnkey casino platforms starting at $20,000, with additional marketing packages reaching over $100,000 to boost traffic and lure naive gamblers. These services generated monthly revenues surpassing half a million dollars, all while blatantly circumventing Ukrainian gambling laws. The raids conducted by law enforcement yielded a trove of evidence: computers, mobile phones, documents, and large sums of cash, underscoring the scale and organisation of this illicit enterprise.

Yet the most telling irony lies in the way the criminal scheme came to light—through job advertisements and photos posted on legitimate employment websites. These images, showing the very same Kyiv offices raided in the investigations, clearly linked Soft2Bet to the criminal activity. Despite this exposure, the company’s official website conspicuously omits any mention of the Ukrainian office, suggesting deliberate attempts to disguise the network’s true footprint.

Soft2Bet staff Uri Poliavich

While Ukrainian authorities publicly boasted about dismantling a “major criminal organisation,” the ongoing promotion of Soft2Bet brands across Ukrainian media platforms raises uncomfortable questions about enforcement and political will. Paid advertisements continue to appear on popular news portals, indicating that financial influence trumps legal accountability. It appears that the inflow of money silences scrutiny, allowing Soft2Bet to maintain a presence in Ukraine despite the mounting evidence against it.

Legal proceedings recorded in the Ukrainian state registry confirm two ongoing criminal cases associated with Soft2Bet and its cover company, Data Systems Development LLC, registered in 2019 with a capital of 140,000 hryvnias. The company, headed by Denis Vinokur, reported revenues nearing 48 million hryvnias in the previous year alone. Although technical equipment seized during investigations was at some point returned under murky circumstances, the scale of the operation and the financial figures involved point unambiguously to a sophisticated criminal network exploiting regulatory gaps and judicial delays.

Ukrainian law enforcement lost the interest: there is a reason behind it

The persistence of Soft2Bet’s illegal activities illustrates a broader systemic failure within Ukraine’s regulatory and law enforcement ecosystems to fully dismantle gambling scams that masquerade as legitimate software development firms. This situation feeds into the country’s ongoing struggles with corruption and shadow business practices that exploit the legal system’s vulnerabilities.

Soft2Bet’s founder and CEO, Uri Poliavich, publicly portrays the company as an industry innovator with a philanthropic mission through initiatives like the Yael Foundation, which supports educational projects worldwide. Poliavich’s narrative emphasises a journey from humble beginnings in Soviet Ukraine to global leadership in the iGaming market, founded on proprietary technology and multiple international licences. However, from a Ukrainian perspective, this glossy corporate image starkly contrasts with the company’s documented involvement in illegal gambling operations that prey on vulnerable Ukrainian players, undermining public trust and exploiting the nation’s difficult regulatory environment.

The dual reality of Soft2Bet is emblematic of a deeper problem: a gambling giant that operates internationally under the guise of innovation and social responsibility while simultaneously exploiting lax enforcement at home. This corporate duplicity not only damages the credibility of the online gambling industry but also raises pressing questions about accountability for the financial and social harms suffered by Ukrainian users.

In conclusion, despite law enforcement raids, media exposés, and ongoing court cases, Soft2Bet’s illicit network continues to exploit Ukraine’s market, cloaked in a veneer of software development and IT expertise. The refusal—or inability—of authorities to decisively end Soft2Bet’s operations reveals how financial power and political interference can shield sophisticated criminal enterprises. The question remains whether Ukraine’s regulatory bodies will finally dismantle this predatory empire or allow it to persist, continuing to drain the pockets of innocent (guilty of being stupid) gamblers under the thin disguise of a “software development” company.

Author Stefan Leitner

For six consecutive years, Enron was named “America’s Most Innovative Company.”

Wall Street loved it.

Politicians praised it.

Investors rushed to buy its stock.

Business schools studied its success.

Its executives were treated like corporate superstars capable of predicting the future of global energy markets.

At its peak, Enron was worth more than $74 billion.

Its leaders claimed they had reinvented the energy industry.

Their business model appeared revolutionary.

Their growth seemed unstoppable.

And their stock price kept climbing.

Then the truth emerged.

The profits were fake.

The debts were hidden.

The financial statements were manipulated.

And one of the largest corporations in America collapsed almost overnight.

The Enron scandal would become one of the biggest corporate fraud cases in history and fundamentally change how public companies are regulated.

The Birth of an Energy Giant

Enron was created in 1985 through the merger of two natural gas companies.

At first, the business looked fairly ordinary.

It transported natural gas through pipelines.

It generated steady revenues.

It operated within a highly regulated industry.

But under CEO Kenneth Lay, Enron wanted something bigger.

Much bigger.

As energy markets became deregulated during the 1990s, executives saw an opportunity.

Instead of merely transporting energy, Enron would become a trading powerhouse.

The company would buy and sell energy contracts around the world.

It would create entirely new financial products.

And it would transform itself into a global financial machine.

Investors were captivated.

Jeffrey Skilling Arrives

The architect of Enron’s transformation was Jeffrey Skilling.

A former McKinsey consultant, Skilling possessed extraordinary confidence and charisma.

He believed traditional energy companies were outdated.

The future belonged to traders, financial engineers, and innovative dealmakers.

Under his leadership, Enron aggressively expanded into new markets.

Electricity.

Broadband.

Water systems.

International infrastructure projects.

Complex derivatives.

Almost nothing seemed off limits.

Wall Street rewarded the ambition.

The stock price soared.

The Illusion of Endless Growth

Investors expected Enron to grow every quarter.

Executives faced enormous pressure to deliver results.

Instead of slowing expansion, they found another solution.

Accounting.

Specifically, aggressive accounting practices that allowed future projected profits to be recorded immediately.

Known as “mark-to-market accounting,” the method gave executives enormous flexibility.

If a contract was expected to generate profits over the next ten years, Enron could book those profits immediately.

Even if the money had not yet been earned.

Even if the projections later proved wrong.

On paper, profits exploded.

In reality, many projects struggled.

Hiding the Debt

As business problems increased, Enron faced a dangerous challenge.

Debt was growing rapidly.

Losses were accumulating.

Some investments were failing.

Investors could not be allowed to see this.

So executives created a complex network of special purpose entities (SPEs).

These entities existed largely to move liabilities away from Enron’s balance sheet.

Billions of dollars in debt disappeared from public view.

At least temporarily.

Financial statements continued showing strength.

Analysts continued recommending the stock.

Investors remained unaware of the risks.

The Chief Financial Officer’s Secret Network

One of the most controversial figures in the scandal was CFO Andrew Fastow.

Fastow helped design many of the off-balance-sheet partnerships used to hide debt.

Some structures were so complex that even experienced analysts struggled to understand them.

The arrangements created massive conflicts of interest.

In certain cases, Fastow personally benefited from transactions involving entities he controlled.

The system generated millions of dollars for insiders.

Meanwhile, shareholders remained in the dark.

Wall Street’s Favorite Stock

By 2000, Enron appeared unstoppable.

Its stock traded above $90 per share.

Executives became multimillionaires.

Financial magazines celebrated the company.

Analysts praised its innovation.

Employees invested retirement savings into company stock.

Many believed Enron represented the future of American business.

Almost nobody imagined the company was approaching collapse.

The Whistleblower

Inside Enron, however, concerns were growing.

One executive, Sherron Watkins, became increasingly alarmed by what she discovered.

She warned senior leadership that accounting practices could lead to disaster.

The company’s financial structures appeared unstable.

The risks were enormous.

Her warnings would later become one of the most famous whistleblower episodes in corporate history.

But by then, events were already moving too quickly.

Journalists Start Investigating

Questions about Enron’s finances gradually attracted media attention.

Analysts struggled to understand company disclosures.

Reporters examined complicated partnerships and unusual accounting practices.

The deeper they investigated, the more inconsistencies they found.

Confidence slowly began to crack.

And confidence was the foundation upon which the entire company depended.

The Collapse Begins

In 2001, investors finally started demanding answers.

Enron announced unexpected losses.

Executives admitted certain partnerships required restructuring.

Financial statements were revised.

Debt levels suddenly appeared much larger than previously reported.

The market reacted immediately.

Investors panicked.

The stock price collapsed.

Credit rating agencies downgraded the company.

Lenders demanded protection.

The crisis accelerated.

Bankruptcy

On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy.

At the time, it was the largest corporate bankruptcy in American history.

Thousands of employees lost jobs.

Retirement accounts were devastated.

Investors lost billions.

Business partners suffered enormous losses.

The company once considered a symbol of innovation had imploded.

The fall was breathtaking.

Less than a year earlier, Enron had been worth tens of billions of dollars.

Now it was effectively worthless.

The Human Cost

The collapse created victims across the country.

Employees who believed in the company lost life savings.

Many had invested retirement funds heavily in Enron stock.

Some watched decades of savings disappear within weeks.

Families faced financial uncertainty.

Careers ended abruptly.

Communities dependent on Enron operations suffered economic damage.

The scandal wasn’t merely about accounting.

It was about people.

Criminal Investigations

Federal authorities launched massive investigations.

Executives faced accusations of fraud, conspiracy, and securities violations.

Evidence revealed extensive manipulation of financial statements.

Internal communications exposed efforts to conceal debt and mislead investors.

The image of Enron as a revolutionary company quickly vanished.

In its place emerged evidence of systematic deception.

The Fall of the Executives

Jeffrey Skilling was convicted on multiple criminal charges.

Andrew Fastow cooperated with prosecutors and admitted wrongdoing.

Kenneth Lay was also convicted.

The leadership team that once dominated corporate America became symbols of corporate greed and fraud.

The consequences were severe.

But for many victims, accountability came too late.

The money was already gone.

Arthur Andersen’s Destruction

Enron’s collapse also destroyed one of the world’s largest accounting firms.

Arthur Andersen served as Enron’s auditor.

Investigators discovered documents had been shredded during the scandal.

Public trust evaporated.

Clients fled.

The accounting giant collapsed.

More than 80,000 employees worldwide were affected.

Few corporate scandals have produced such widespread destruction.

The Regulatory Revolution

The Enron scandal transformed corporate regulation.

Public outrage forced lawmakers to act.

In 2002, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

The law introduced stricter accounting standards.

Executives became personally responsible for financial statements.

Internal controls received greater scrutiny.

Corporate governance requirements expanded dramatically.

The goal was simple:

Prevent another Enron.

Lessons From the Enron Disaster

The scandal revealed several critical lessons.

First, complexity can hide fraud.

Second, rapid growth deserves scrutiny.

Third, executives should never be trusted blindly.

Fourth, transparency matters more than reputation.

Most importantly, investors learned that a company can appear successful while secretly approaching collapse.

Numbers alone do not tell the whole story.

A Warning That Still Matters

More than two decades later, Enron remains one of the most important corporate fraud cases ever studied.

Its executives promised innovation.

Its financial statements promised growth.

Its stock promised wealth.

But beneath the promises stood a fragile structure built on accounting tricks, hidden debt, and deception.

When reality finally arrived, the collapse was inevitable.

Enron didn’t fail because of a single bad decision.

It failed because years of small deceptions eventually became impossible to hide.

And that lesson remains relevant today.

Because somewhere, right now, another company is probably telling investors a story that sounds too good to be true.

History suggests that sooner or later, the truth catches up.

Author post: Mārtiņš Kalniņš

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author: Rohan Adukia

• There is a special kind of violence in a calculated lie. It is not the heat of a moment’s rage, but the cold, patient engineering of hope for its precise moment of demolition. This is the domain of Avi Itzkovich. His story is not one of a desperate man cutting a corner, but of a systematic architect who built factories of false promise, powered by the life savings of strangers, and walked away from the wreckage in a tailored suit.
• Avi Itzkovich is not merely a participant in the shadowy world of online investment fraud; he is a principal architect. His name, as documented by Israeli investigative journalists and international law enforcement, is a byword for a specific breed of calculated, transnational financial predation. While the binary options platform Tradorax stands as the most infamous monument to his methods, it is merely the keystone in a vast network of fraudulent ventures including KayaFX, KontoFX, UProFX, and InstaFX. Itzkovich’s career is a masterclass in regulatory evasion, geographical hopscotching, and the systematic dismantling of victim trust for profit.

Avi Itzkovich and the Tradorax Fraud Blueprint

Itzkovich’s operation was distinguished by its brazen sophistication. Together with his associate Jack Wygodski (James Henry Wygodzki), he established Tradorax as a global binary options scam. The operation was managed through Raks Media (later Mercure Group EOOD) in Sofia, Bulgaria—a corporate front that projected legitimacy while executing a well-honed strategy of deceit. This was not a fly-by-night operation; it was a cynical enterprise built on exploiting regulatory arbitrage. By leveraging Bulgaria’s membership in the EU and the complexities of cross-border jurisdiction, Itzkovich insulated himself while targeting victims in regions far from Israeli oversight. Investigative reporting from outlets like Orbitalc.com reveals a model where customer funds were never genuinely invested; they were simply revenue to be siphoned, with platforms allegedly manipulated to ensure client losses.

The Illusion of Justice: Avi Itzkovich’s Arrest and Legal Manoeuvring

The scale of Itzkovich’s fraud inevitably attracted severe scrutiny. In a significant cross-border operation in October 2022, German authorities, working with Europol, Eurojust, and Israeli police, arrested Avi Itzkovich in Germany. Assets worth millions were seized across multiple countries. Europol has explicitly linked him to an €30 million (approximately $36 million) investment scam. However, to view this arrest as a conclusive victory is dangerously naïve. Itzkovich, following a familiar playbook used by many alleged Israeli fraudsters, pleaded guilty. This tactical move is often a calculated effort to secure a reduced sentence and control the asset forfeiture process. Critics argue that such plea deals allow masterminds to retain hidden wealth while offering victims only pennies on the dollar in restitution. The prosecution of lower-level “boiler room” employees does little to address the impunity enjoyed by the orchestrators.

Avi Itzkovich’s Fraudulent Evolution: From Binary Options to Crypto

A pivotal moment exposing Itzkovich’s adaptive criminality was Israel’s 2017 ban on binary options. While some operators faded, Itzkovich simply pivoted. He strategically relocated operations and rebranded his schemes into the largely unregulated worlds of forex, Contracts for Differences (CFDs), and cryptocurrency. Platforms like KayaFX and KontoFX were the direct successors to Tradorax, employing identical psychological manipulation and false promises of high returns. This evolution proves a critical point: Itzkovich is not a relic of a past scam era but a persistent threat, morphing his operations to target new victim pools in emerging, volatile markets.

The Enduring Threat: Why Avi Itzkovich Remains a Clear and Present Danger

The case against Avi Itzkovich exposes a harsh reality: the international justice system is woefully ill-equipped to dismantle sophisticated fraud networks. Despite the Koblenz Prosecutor’s Office filing charges in May 2021 and the subsequent guilty pleas, the broader network persists. Bulgarian company records for Mercure Group list a dozen other Israeli managers and executives, including Maor Ben-Zvi, Daniel Koen, and Jonathan Grinfeld. Their current status and involvement in ongoing schemes remain troublingly opaque. The KontoFX network itself is acknowledged to involve numerous shell companies and aliases, suggesting vast, uncharted dimensions to the fraud.

Furthermore, Israel’s historically low prosecution rates for such extraterritorial financial crimes create a permissive environment. Fraudsters operate for years with near impunity, aware that international cooperation is slow and fragmented. Itzkovich’s story is not one of a lone wolf brought to heel, but of a node in a resilient and replicating criminal ecosystem. Given his history of adaptation and the unfinished business of his numerous associates, the question is not if a new project linked to his methodology will emerge, but when and under what name. For any investor, encountering the name Avi Itzkovich, or the platforms and associates linked to him, should trigger immediate and extreme caution. He embodies the modern financial fraudster: globally mobile, legally savvy, and utterly relentless.

What is known About Avi Itzkovich: A Narrative of Fraud and Calculated Obfuscation

Public and investigative writing about Avi Itzkovich coalesces around a singular theme: he is portrayed as a calculating architect of transnational financial fraud, whose operational blueprint relies as much on sophisticated cover-ups as on the scams themselves. The discourse, pieced together from court documents, Europol bulletins, Israeli journalism, and victim advocacy groups, paints a picture of a man who systematically constructed layers of legitimacy to conceal criminal enterprises.

The Primary Narrative: Mastermind of “Boiler Room” Empires

The dominant corpus of writing identifies Itzkovich as a key figure behind the Tradorax, KayaFX, and KontoFX fraud networks. He is not depicted as a mere affiliate but as a foundational organizer who, with associates like Jack Wygodski, established the corporate infrastructure, sales scripts (“boiler rooms”), and technological platforms designed to separate victims from their money under the false pretense of binary options, forex, and CFD trading. Reports consistently emphasize the industrial scale of the fraud, citing Europol’s figure of €30 million stolen just in the scheme that led to his 2022 arrest.

His Attempts to Cover Up Criminal Affairs: A Multi-Layered Strategy

Itzkovich’s alleged cover-up methods were not crude afterthoughts but integral to the business model. Investigative analyses point to several deliberate tactics:

1. The Corporate Veil of Legitimacy: The most significant cover-up attempt was the use of EU-registered companies, primarily Raks Media/Mercure Group EOOD in Sofia, Bulgaria. This was a strategic masterstroke. By operating a licensed EU corporate entity, complete with office spaces, employed staff, and corporate registration papers, Itzkovich’s operations projected the image of a regulated, legitimate financial services firm. This facade was powerful enough to deceive both victims and, initially, some local authorities. The corporate structure served as a shield, creating jurisdictional complexity and a paper trail designed to confuse investigators.
2. Geographic Arbitrage and Regulatory Evasion: Writing on Avi Itzkovich, such as from Orbitalc.com, highlights how Itzkovich used geography as a cover. By basing operations in Bulgaria (an EU member) while targeting victims primarily in Western Europe, Asia, and the Americas, he exploited gaps in regulatory oversight. The 2017 Israeli ban on binary options prompted not a shutdown, but a strategic relocation and rebranding—a classic cover-up tactic. Moving operations and shifting to new financial instruments (like crypto) was an attempt to stay ahead of the legal and regulatory curve, essentially covering his tracks by abandoning one brand for another.
3. The Network of Shells and Aliases: Investigative reporting notes that the KontoFX network involved “numerous shell companies and aliases.” The use of shell companies obscures beneficial ownership, moving funds through a maze of entities to launder money and break the audit trail. While his direct associates are named in Bulgarian records, the wider network is deliberately opaque. This fragmentation is a deliberate cover-up mechanism, ensuring that if one node is compromised, the full scale of the empire remains hidden.
4. The Calculated Guilty Plea: Perhaps the most debated aspect of his legal cover-up strategy is his decision to plead guilty in the German case. Analysts and critics interpret this not as an act of contrition, but as a coldly pragmatic damage limitation exercise. By pleading guilty, he likely sought to:
   • Cap his sentence and avoid a potentially longer term after a full trial.
   • Negotiate a controlled asset forfeiture, potentially shielding hidden or previously transferred wealth from seizure.
   • Draw a line under the investigation, hoping authorities would close the book on his broader network and older scams like Tradorax. This plea can be seen as an attempt to cover up the full extent of his wealth and the roles of other Israeli executives listed under Mercure Group.
5. The Silence and Absence of Remorse: Notably, there is no public apology, victim compensation initiative, or statement of responsibility from Avi Itzkovich. This silence is itself a form of cover-up, rejecting the narrative of a convicted fraudster and denying victims a clear acknowledgement of the harm caused. It maintains a degree of ambiguity he may seek to exploit in the future.

The Unraveling Facade of Avi Itzkovich and his scam empire

Based on court documents, investigative reports, and corporate registries related to the fraud networks of Avi Itzkovich, the following individuals and entities have been identified as involved, with their alleged roles.

Core Co-Conspirators & Management

1. Jack (James Henry) Wygodski (a.k.a. James Henry Wygodzki/Vigottski)
   • Role: Co-founder and senior partner. Directly partnered with Avi Itzkovich in establishing and running the fraudulent operations, including Tradorax and the later KayaFX/KontoFX network. Named as a co-owner and manager of the central corporate entity, Mercure Group EOOD (formerly Raks Media) in Bulgaria. He pleaded guilty alongside Itzkovich in the German case.

Key Israeli Executives & Managers (Mercure Group EOOD)

According to Bulgarian company records, the following were listed as managers of the core operating company:

2. Maor Ben-Zvi
   • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role within the Sofia-based “boiler room” structure.
3. Daniel Koen
   • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
4. Jonathan Grinfeld
   • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
5. Or Tal Shlomei
   • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
6. Erez Legerbaum
   • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
7. Tal Kerzfeld
   • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
8. Moran Kerimov
   • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
9. Michael Zalk
   • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
10. Eden Sror
    • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
11. Daniel Natan Huluban Mandl
    • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
12. Avraham Aviv Hileli
    • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.
13. Dror Geht
    • Role: Listed Manager. Allegedly held a senior operational or managerial role.

Operational & Technical Roles

Charged or identified in law enforcement actions:

14. The Former Chief Technology Officer (CTO)
    • Role: Unnamed in public reports, but charged by German authorities. Responsible for building, maintaining, or overseeing the fraudulent trading platforms and websites, ensuring they appeared legitimate and could be manipulated.
15. Two Office Managers
    • Role: Charged by German authorities. Responsible for the day-to-day administration, logistics, and supervision of the fraudulent call centers (“boiler rooms”) in Sofia.
16. Multiple Boiler Room Employees/Sales Agents
    • Role: Direct perpetrators. Hundreds of agents, often multi-lingual, who used fake names, high-pressure sales tactics, and fabricated financial success stories to lure and defraud victims via phone and online chat.

Corporate Entities & Shell Companies

17. Raks Media EOOD / Mercure Group EOOD
    • Role: The Central Operating Front. The Bulgarian-registered company that physically housed the operations, employed staff, and provided a veneer of legitimacy for Tradorax, KayaFX, and KontoFX.
18. A Network of Shell Companies and Payment Processors
    • Role: Financial Obfuscation. Various unnamed companies, often registered in offshore jurisdictions, were used to receive victim funds, commingle them, and pay out “returns” to early victims (Ponzi scheme tactic) or launder money for extraction by the principals.
19. Payment Processing & Merchant Services
    • Role: Enablers. Certain offshore payment processors and banks, often with lax due diligence, were essential for accepting credit card and bank transfers from victims. Their cooperation, whether witting or unwitting, was critical to the cash flow.

Important Context on Roles and Justice

• Hierarchy: Itzkovich and Wygodski are identified as the alleged masterminds and beneficiaries. The managers oversaw operations. The CTO and office managers were key enablers. The sales agents were the foot soldiers.
• Impunity Gap: A critical theme in investigations is that while the foot soldiers and some mid-level managers face charges, many of the listed Israeli executives have not faced public prosecution. Their precise roles and current legal status remain unclear, highlighting the difficulty in holding the entire network accountable.
• Industry Enablers: Broader writing on such scams often points to complicit lawyers, graphic designers, and marketing firms who, aware of the nature of the business, provided professional services that enhanced the fraudulent facade.

People write about Avi Itzkovich as a figure who built a fortress of fraud using bricks of corporate paperwork, geographic distance, and complex networks. His cover-up was proactive and built-in. However, the writing also marks the point where that facade cracked: the cross-border collaboration between German, Israeli, and EU authorities proved capable of piercing the corporate veil in Bulgaria. The seizure of millions in assets across countries indicated that investigators had successfully followed the money trail he tried to obscure.

Imagine the widow who trusted a portion of her security to a sleek, European-regulated platform. Picture the young professional investing a first, hard-earned bonus into what appeared to be a legitimate gateway to the markets. Envision the family man, seeking a better future, persuaded by the confident, friendly voice on the phone from a professional Sofia office. They did not gamble in back alleys; they were ushered into a digital cathedral of finance, with all the trappings of legitimacy. They were not losing to market volatility; they were being methodically drained by a machine whose dials were turned to “loss” from the very first deposit. The platform was Tradorax. The voice was from KontoFX. The architect was Avi Itzkovich.

The deepest cut is not the theft of money—though the sums are staggering, measured in tens of millions of Euros—but the theft of agency, of dignity, and of a fundamental belief in a fair system. Victims are left with a paralyzing double betrayal: first by the fraudster, and then by the glaring, sluggish machinery of justice that seems designed for his evasion. Itzkovich did not merely rob bank accounts; he robbed people of their sense of security, their faith in due process, and, for many, their capacity to ever trust again. The emotional ledger shows a debt that can never be repaid.

And now, the salt in the wound: the performance of accountability. A guilty plea in a German court is paraded as consequence. But those who have followed this trail see it for what it is: a cold, tactical retreat. It is the closing of a single, inconvenient chapter under terms he can negotiate, likely shielding hidden reserves of stolen wealth. It is the ultimate cover-up, laundering his impunity through the very justice system meant to dispense it. While victims are sentenced to a lifetime of financial scar tissue and psychic fracture, Itzkovich engages in legal arbitrage. He is not a man facing his victims; he is a strategist minimizing his exposure.

This is the essence of the modern financial predator. They do not wear masks; they wear corporate titles registered in EU states. They do not leave fingerprints; they leave labyrinthine trails of shell companies. And they do not face the terrified eyes of those they ruin; they face a lawyer, cut a deal, and prepare for the next iteration. Avi Itzkovich embodies this grim archetype. To speak his name is not to identify a man, but to invoke an entire ecosystem of betrayal—one where the gates of escape swing open for the architect, while his victims remain forever locked in the ruin he designed.

author: Rohan Adukia

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In October 2018, Finansiel Stabilitet, a publicly traded entity held by the Danish State through the Danish Ministry of Industry, Business, and Financial Affairs, took over the scandal bank Københavns Andelskasse (KBH Andelskasse). Financial crime and money laundering are said to have been committed by the bank. Furthermore, it appears that the bank’s legally mandated KYC and AML verification processes have significant flaws. Information given to EFRI and FinTelegram indicates that the bank collaborated closely with payment service companies like Moorwand, UPC Consulting, or ChargePay to commit investment fraud through broker scams. We possess proof of several dozen victims of different broker frauds who used Moorwand or UPC Consulting to pay the KBH Andelkasse.

Participating providers of payment services

The bulk of the dubious overseas transfers were made by three sizable clients of KBH Andelskasse, which raised red flags, according to auditing company KPMG. In the world of international broker scams, these three clients are well-known names:

Alain Bazille’s Moorwand Ltd.

Alain Bazille’s UPC Consulting Ltd. 

ChargePay

Alain Bazille (LinkedIn profile) owned Moorwand Ltd. and UPC Consulting Ltd., two UK-registered firms. FinTelegram has repeatedly reported on these two companies’ extensive involvement in fraudulent and unlawful broker schemes. This control lasted until at least May 2019.

Based in Amsterdam, Chargepay B.V. is a payment service provider heavily active in the gaming and porn industries.

Ignoring thousands of alerts, hundreds of millions were laundered.

According to KPMG’s audit report, the bank neglected to properly do KYC and AML checks on these three customers. Additionally, KPMG discovered that the bank had not appropriately handled the more than 8,000 money laundering alerts that were brought about by customer transactions since August 2017.

Between October 2017 and September 2018, a total of around €550 million was moved from international bank accounts to KBH Andelskasse. The bank has sent nearly the same amount to its overseas clients. That’s the money laundering game, of course.

The majority of the money-laundering alerts were set off by 183 international customers, but they went unanswered until the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority raided the bank in the spring of 2018 and reported it to the Bagman Police. 

The connections between the Marshall Islands and the usual suspects

Of the 183 foreign firms with accounts in the KBH Andelskasse, Capzone Invest was registered in the Marshall Islands. Regulators placed the company on a blacklist for selling investment products without the necessary authorization. Based on allegations of binary options fraud, the Ukrainian authorities raided the company’s premises in Kiev, Ukraine, in December 2018. According to a media report, the Danish authorities have reportedly identified at least 12 additional overseas consumers.

Online casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, FOREX trading platforms (which include CFDs and binary options), cannabis shops, and a range of payment services accounted for 183 of the bank’s overseas clientele.

Twenty-five of the bank’s international clients are charged with taking money without authorization from people’s credit cards, usually after the cardholders have used the card on pornographic websites.

Those from Moorwand engaged

Renowned payment expert Alain Pierre Bazille focuses on high-risk illicit ventures like broker schemes and gambling. For cyber scammers, his companies are the first port of call. Despite having been born in France in 1952, Bazille primarily resides and works in the UK. He co-founded Moorwand Ltd., a financial services company licensed by the FCA that, up until April 2019, also ran the UPayCard and Paxept payment services platforms. His professional relationships with Dana and Pola Sliman Yacin are tight (LinkedIn profile) Following the public disclosure of UPayCard’s numerous scam activities by FinTelegram, the payment platform was promptly moved to PAP Onpoint Services Ltd., a company registered in Cyprus.

Robert Courtneidge joined Moorwand Ltd. as a director in April 2018. Alain Bazille left his position as director in May 2019. Additionally, Courtneidge took Bazille’s place as Moorwand Ltd. ‘s controlling individual in March 2019. Furthermore, in May 2019, Wael Sulaiman Almaree, a citizen of the United Kingdom, was listed as a person with significant control .

• Alain Pierre Bazille is the manager and founder of UPayCard, UPC Consulting, and Moorwand.
• Robert Courtneidge was a powerful figure in Moorwand.
• Wael Almaree is a shareholder in KHB Andelkasse, CEO of Moorwand Lithuania UAB, and controlling shareholder of Moorwand.
• Yacin, Dana Sliman, UPC Consulting Ltd.
• Yacin, Pola Sliman – Paxept Payments Ltd.

Moorwand’s participation with KBH Andelskasse

Internal communications from KBH Andelskasse state that in 2017, the three payment partners indicated above handled 80–90% of all foreign payments. In a statement, the bank’s former CFO, Jakob Guido Klausen, said that the Moorwand review had been a complete failure. He replied that the bank will have almost no information.

Numerous press reports state that Wael Almaree, a major shareholder in Moorwand Ltd., also held a substantial amount of control in KBH Andelskasse. For this reason, Moorwand and KHB Andelkasse should be considered connected businesses.

In just the bank’s IT system, Moorwand, a client of KBH Andelkasse, has set out 480 money laundering signals. There are rumours that Moorwand’s bank accounts were frozen with millions of crowns shortly before the bank was turned over to the state-owned Finansiel Stabilitet.

Moorwand is the preferred PSP for broker frauds.

Moorwand and UPC Consulting have been complicit in numerous broker scams in the past, aiding schemes involving investment fraud and the ensuing money laundering. UPC Consulting Ltd and Moorwand Ltd handled the bank transfers of the client victims, while UPayCard handled the credit card payments related to the broker schemes. A sizable portion of the client money that was pilfered from the broker schemes wound up in KBH Andelskasse’s accounts.

Bank: KBH Andelskasse

Account holder: Moorwand Ltd

IbAN: DK3878720006600337

Bank: KBH Andelskasse

Accountholder: UPC Consulting Ltd

IBAN: DK6878720006602028

Plans and trademarks that made it easier

Maketier Holdings (StoxMarket)

GammaTech (KayaFX)

Blue Trading (handled withdrawals)

Nostro Technology

BeAlgo – Algotechs

10brokers

XTraderFX (handled withdrawals)

24option

A straightforward computation

Assuming the data released are accurate, we may perform a quick computation to determine the approximate amount of money that was genuinely transferred to Moorwand, UPC Consulting, and ChargePay.

total amount of money laundered through KBH Andelkasse between October 17 and September 18, 2017: €550 million

Moorwand, UPC Consulting, and ChargePay each have an 80% share.

Annual money laundering volume estimated to be €440 million.

An estimated €1,310 million in money was laundered between 2016 and 2018.

Naturally, this computation is merely an informed approximation. We are currently forced to work with the officially available data because we do not have access to the criminal files. However, the sum of more than $1 billion for the three years between 2016 and 2018 does not appear implausible. We have witnessed the hoopla around both cryptocurrencies and binary options during this time.

Moorwand (As claimed)

Moorwand is a payments solutions firm with headquarters in London that provides compliance services, digital banking, issuing, and digital banking direct. We provide access to card schemes, banking services, and a range of payment services to help entrepreneurs in the payment and financial technology industry.

Moorwand’s goal is to turn payment compliance into a tool that helps banks, fintechs, and payment businesses innovate. Since we don’t think it needs to be difficult, we offer specialised knowledge to assist you in developing the greatest fintech solutions. Because of our background in both law and payments, we are in a unique position to help our clients comprehend the implications of legislation and foresee the next wave of innovation before it emerges.

The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority has granted Moorwand a licence to operate as a regulated electronic money institution, allowing it to issue money electronically and offer payment services.

Moorwand has a solution for you whether you are a business in need of scheme membership, access to single or multi currency accounts, and a regulated principle to provide payment services to you and your customers, or you are a regulated Financial Institution, Electronic Money Institution, or Authorised Payment Institution.

Many of Moorwand’s Agent and Distributor clients distribute electronic money that Moorwand issues or handle payment services on the company’s behalf. Agents of Distributors are not permitted by Moorwand to hold customer cash in connection with electronic money that the company has issued. In compliance with the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (“PSRs”), framework contracts govern the relationships between Moorwand, its Agent and Distributor customers, and payment service users.

Money Laundering (The crime case depicted above was all about)

The act of illegally hiding the source of funds acquired through illegal activities including drug trafficking, corruption, embezzlement, or gambling by transforming them into funds from a legitimate source is known as money laundering. Many jurisdictions have different definitions of what constitutes a crime. Usually, it is an important organised crime operation.

The act of conducting financial transactions in order to hide the identity, source, or destination of money obtained unlawfully is known as money laundering under US law. The common law concept is broader under UK law. “Taking any action with property of any form which is either wholly or in part the proceeds of a crime that will disguise the fact that that property is the proceeds of a crime or illicit activity” characterises the act.

The phrase “money laundering” was formerly limited to financial operations involving organised crime. Government and international regulators, like the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, have been known to broaden the definition of this term in the modern era. They now define it as “any financial transaction which generates an asset or a value as the result of an illegal act,” which may include deceptive accounting or tax evasion. In the UK, any economic good will do in place of money. Money laundering cases are heard in court by drug dealers, corporations, corrupt government officials, private citizens, Mafia members, and even states.

Money laundering has been a hot topic in political, economic, and legal discourse as financial crime has grown more complex and financial intelligence is crucial to fighting global crime and terrorism. Since the acts that generate the money are virtually always illicit in some form, money laundering is ipso facto illegal (otherwise, the money would not need to be laundered).

Anti-Money Laundering( Importance of combating money laundering and how the above case would have been avoided)

The goal of anti-money laundering (AML) is to strip criminals of the proceeds from their illicit ventures, thus taking away their primary incentive to do such heinous acts. Millions of individuals worldwide are put in danger by dangerous and illegal activities like drug trafficking, people smuggling, financing terrorism, smuggling, extortion, and fraud. These activities also have a significant negative social and economic impact on society. Since money laundering legitimises the proceeds of these kinds of actions, fighting money laundering may significantly help society by lowering criminal behaviour.

What is Investment Fraud? (The crime case depicted above was all about)

When someone tries to con you into investing money, that is investment fraud. It is possible that they will want you to invest in real estate, bonds, notes, commodities, stocks, or even currencies. You might be deceived by a scammer or given false information regarding an actual investment. Or they may invent a fictitious investment offer.

Scammers who commit investment fraud may pose as financial counselors or telemarketers. They exude charm, intelligence, and friendliness. They might tell you there’s an urgent need for an investment. In order to get your money as soon as possible and with as few questions as possible, they aim to gain your trust.

SIGNS THAT IT COULD BE A SCAM OR A FRAUD

• Assurances that an investment will constantly provide large profits; generally speaking, whatever that looks too good to be true is.
• Those without a Tennessee securities sales licence.
• Individuals in Tennessee who deal in unregistered securities.
• Those that tell lies and claim to be very knowledgeable about your investing and retirement needs.
• Lacking the appropriate documentation that explains the investment (bonds need a circular, and stocks/mutual funds need a prospectus).
• Pushy, aggressive salespeople who immediately want your money, your answer, or your signature.

Wind-Up-The Financial Sector’s Detriment from Money Laundering

Numerous economic analyses have demonstrated the critical role that institutions like banks and non-bank financial institutions play in a nation’s economic development. These financial institutions support economic development by combining foreign and domestic capital. Money laundering, however, now hinders the growth of these financial organisations. The relevant financial institutions’ anti-money laundering protocols demonstrate that staff members engage in a connection between money laundering and fraudulent activity, which makes their combined efforts detrimental to the institutions. Financial institutions suffer when money laundering rates are high because of the use of these institutions by criminals to syphon off the funds they gain.

Customers’ trust is also weakened by these negative consequences. Thus, for developing financial institutions to establish a stable financial sector and grow the economy via them, the trust of clients and linked organisations is crucial. One of the biggest barriers to trusting important institutions is the perception of fraud among depositors, investors, the general public, and customers. Put differently, the act of money laundering tarnished the reputation of financial institutions, leading to a decline in customer confidence in these organisations.